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THIRTEEN FALSE BLACKBIRDS 
RUTHANN ROBSON† 
The United States Supreme Court will soon review the Ninth Circuit’s panel 
opinion invalidating Proposition 8, California’s voter-passed constitutional 
amendment that eliminated same-sex marriage.1 Predictions about the shape and 
substance of any eventual opinion are wildly speculative. Nevertheless, perhaps 
this is the most appropriate time for advice, even wild advice. 
This piece is a creative intervention inspired by two disparate sets of thirteen 
passages: Wallace Stevens’ iconic poem, “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black-
bird,”2 and the section “Thirteen Falsities Exposed” in Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
recent co-authored volume Reading Law.3 It offers thirteen “false blackbirds” 
that the majority opinion in Hollingsworth v. Perry should avoid. 
I. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF NEUTRALITY 
Intervenors Hollingsworth and ProtectMarriage.com argued below that 
Judge Vaughn Walker, the trial judge, was not sufficiently impartial to render a 
decision on Proposition 8 because of his sexual orientation.4 After the decision, 
and after resigning from the bench, Walker “disclosed that he was gay and that 
he had for the past ten years been in a relationship with another man.”5 The pro-
ponents of Proposition 8 moved to vacate the judgment, arguing Walker was ob-
ligated either to recuse himself because he had an “interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding” or to disclose his potential 
conflict because “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”6 
 
Judge Ware, the Chief Judge who replaced Walker, held that in “a case that 
 
† Professor of Law and University Distinguished Professor, City University of New York 
School of Law. I am grateful to the editors of the N.Y.U. Review of Law and Social Change for 
their receptivity to the unconventional form of this intervention and their professional work. I am 
also appreciative of the reactions and research assistance from Emile Primeaux, Class of 2013, 
City University of New School of Law. 
1. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144). 
2. Wallace Stevens, “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” (1917), available at 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/174503. The poem is reprinted in the appendix below. 
3. Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 
(2012) [hereinafter, READING LAW].  
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could affect the general public based on the circumstances or characteristics of 
various members of that public, the fact that a federal judge happens to share the 
same circumstances or characteristic and will only be affected in a similar man-
ner because the judge is a member of the public, is not a basis for disqualifying 
the judge.”7 
 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.8 
 
The United States Supreme Court should affirm the affirmation. 
 
But the Court should also affirm that neutrality  is aspirational rather than 
achievable. 
 
It is not achievable by the poet observing blackbirds: 
 
But I know, too 
That the blackbird is involved 
In what I know.9 
 
It is not achievable by the faint-hearted originalist: “The false notion that 
words should be strictly construed.”10 
 
But as an aspiration, as an affirmative act, the Justices who have been mar-
ried should recuse themselves from Perry. 
 
A decision rendered by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan would be forthcom-
ing. 
II. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF PATRIARCHY 
Does it mean anything that two of the three women Justices on the Court 
have never been married? 
 
Does it tell us anything that half of the total of four women Justices on the 
Court have never been married? 
 
7. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1125 (N.D. Cal. 2011) aff’d sub nom. 
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012).  
8. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1095. 
9. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 8. 
10. READING LAW, supra note 3, at 355.  
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Here is Judge Ware again: 
The presumption that Judge Walker, by virtue of being in a 
same-sex relationship, had a desire to be married that rendered 
him incapable of making an impartial decision, is as warrantless 
as the presumption that a female judge is incapable of being im-
partial in a case in which women seek legal relief. On the con-
trary: it is reasonable to presume that a female judge or a judge 
in a same-sex relationship is capable of rising above any per-
sonal predisposition and deciding such a case on the merits.11 
 
Here is Wallace Stevens, a poet, a lawyer, unsuccessful in marriage: 
 
“Do you not see how the blackbird 
Walks around the feet 
Of the women about you?”12 
 
Recall, in Shelley v. Kraemer, three Justices recused themselves, presuma-
bly because they owned property that had racially restrictive covenants.13 
 
Scalia and Garner illustrate one of their maxims by stating: 
 
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional 
state statutes that in no way contradicted any specific provision 
of the Constitution.14 
 
Recall the opinions of the women Justices in Roe v. Wade and Shelley v. 
Kraemer.15 
 
11. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 1133. 
12. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 7. 
13. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that court enforcement of racially restric-
tive property covenants violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); Leland B. 
Ware, Invisible Walls: An Examination of the Legal Strategy of the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 67 
Wash. U. L.Q. 737, 761 (1989) (“Three of the nine Supreme Court Justices did not participate in 
the covenant cases decision. Justices Jackson, Reed and Rutledge recused themselves. No official 
reason was given but it was widely assumed that they lived in homes that were subject to restric-
tive covenants.”) 
14. READING LAW, supra note 3, at 345 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
15. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Justice San-
dra Day O’Connor, the first female Justice of the United States Supreme Court, was appointed in 
1981.  
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III. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF OBFUSCATION 
Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, writing for the Court, should eschew the ob-
fuscation of Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. 
Evans.16 
 
Instead, they should study a concurral and dissental—lovely new words17—
by Eleventh Circuit judges applying Lawrence and Romer to Florida’s explicit 
ban on “homosexuals” adopting children. In his concurral, Judge Stanley Birch 
rejected the Court’s opinion in Lawrence as too—although he does not use the 
word—poetic.18 In her dissental, Judge Rosemary Barkett finds Lawrence’s rec-
ognition of “the longstanding right of consenting adults to engage in private sex-
ual conduct” to be binding precedent that should invalidate the Florida ban as 
unconstitutional.19 
 
Reflection assignment #1: “whatever lip-service is rendered to the idea of 
justice, no real account is taken of justice,” and this is how it should be.20 
 
16. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In both 
Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans, the constitutional doctrine is unclear and ambiguous, a 
deficit noticed by many scholars. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Monogamy, Licentiousness, Desuetude 
and Mere Tolerance: The Multiple Misinterpretations of Lawrence v. Texas, 15 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN’S STUD. 95, 133 (2005) (noting that “the Lawrence opinion might have been clearer”) (cit-
ing Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy after Lawrence v. 
Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 38 (2004) (suggesting that criticism “could be leveled at Jus-
tice Kennedy for failing to write a clear, crisp, clean opinion that could serve as a guide in future 
cases”)); Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay And Lesbian Free Zone”: On 
the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers. [Raising Questions about Law-
rence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 505 (2004) (“Justice 
Kennedy’s pastiche in Lawrence is, at a legal theoretical level, incoherent, and under normal cir-
cumstances—in many other cases—would be internally contradictory.”). 
Similarly, Professor Strasser analyzes the various strands of Romer v. Evans, noting that one 
“argument has received less attention than others because of some ambiguous comments made by 
the Romer Court.” Mark Strasser, From Colorado to Alaska by Way of Cincinnati: On Romer, 
Equality Foundation, and the Constitutionality of Referenda, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 1193, 1232 (1999) 
(“The Romer Court noted that the Colorado Supreme Court's decision striking down Amendment 2 
was based on the “voting rights cases” and on “precedents involving discriminatory restructuring 
of governmental decisionmaking. However, in affirming the Colorado Supreme Court, the United 
States Supreme Court explicitly relied on a ‘rationale different from that adopted by the State Su-
preme Court.’”) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625–26 (1996)). 
17. Alex Kozinski & James Burnham, I Say Dissental, You Say Concurral, 121 YALE L. J. 
ONLINE 601 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/04/10/kozinski&burnham.html (“Increasing 
numbers of circuit judges are writing dissents from, and concurrences in, orders denying rehearing 
en banc—colloquially known as dissentals and concurrals.”). 
18. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dept. of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1275 (11th Cir. 
2004) (Birch, J., concurr. in the denial of reh’g en banc). 
19. Id. at 1307 (Barkett, J., dissenting from the denial of reh’g en banc). 
20. READING LAW, supra note 3, at 347 (quoting Max Radin, A Juster Justice, a More Lawful 
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Reflection assignment #2: “….he mistook/ The shadow of his equipage/ For 
blackbirds.”21 
 
Instead, they should study—and attempt to emulate—the cogency, clarity, 
and crispness of the Iowa Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in Varnum v. 
Brien, declaring the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage violates the 
state constitution.22 
IV. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF HISTORY I 
Justice Scalia warns us against the “false notion that lawyers and judges, not 
being historians, are unqualified to do the historical research that originalism re-
quires.”23 
 
Wallace Stevens tells us “The river is moving. / The blackbird must be fly-
ing.”24 
 
In 1858, Senator James Hammond of South Carolina famously defended 
race-based slavery as natural. Hammond gave the speech to his fellow senators 
on the floor of the Senate; its written form has been widely available ever 
since.25 
V. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF HISTORY II 
Although too often ignored, we may take note that Justice Scalia’s historical 
recitations are often criticized as inaccurate.26 
 
Although scrupulously ignored, we may take note that Wallace Stevens’ 
similarly structured poem, which we will inaccurately call “Like Decorations in 
 
Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN KIP MCMURRAY 537, 537 (Max Radin & A.M. Kidd 
eds., 1935)). 
21. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 11. 
22. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
23. READING LAW, supra note 3, at 399. 
24. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 12. 
25. Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 68–71 (1858) (statement of Sen. James 
Henry Hammond, On the Admission of Kansas, Under the Lecompton Constitution). 
26. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia: A Review of Reading Law: 
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a ____ Cemetery,”27 was racist, even for 1935. 
 
Although almost always ignored, we may take note that Senator 
Hammond’s early “lustful appetite” was directed at other young men, though 
he’d be damned if he didn’t marry, and marry he did, in that fortunate manner of 
young men seeking to enter the Southern slave-owning aristocracy.28 
VI. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF COWARDICE 
Kagan and Sotomayor, writing their opinion for the Court, need not fear 
they will be voted out of office. 
 
This was not the case for justices of the Iowa Supreme Court in 2010. When 
three of the seven justices stood for merit retention in the 2010 election, the 
unanimous opinion in Varnum v. Brien was the focal point of the successful ef-
forts to unseat them.29 
 
All of the current justices on the Iowa Supreme Court are now male and 
white.30 
 
Justice David Wiggins, who joined the unanimous opinion in Varnum v. 
Brien, is facing retention election in 2012 and has been targeted by anti-same-
sex marriage conservatives.31 
 
This is not to say that there are not calls to reform the federal judiciary and 
eliminate life-tenure.32 
 
27. Wallace Stevens, Like Decorations in a ____ Cemetery, 45 POETRY 239 (1935), available 
at http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poetrymagazine/browse/45/5#20579785. 
28. See Martin Bauml Duberman, “Writhing Bedfellows” in Antebellum South Carolina: His-
torical Interpretation and the Politics of Evidence, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING THE 
GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 153 (1989).  
29. For an excellent discussion, see Todd E. Pettys, Letter from Iowa: Same-Sex Marriage 
and the Ouster of Three Justices, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 715 (2011). 
30. See Ruthann Robson, Iowa Supreme Court Update, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG 
(February 25, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/02/iowa-supreme-court-
update.html (noting that Governor did not choose the only one of the nine candidates for the three 
vacancies who was not a white male). For a portrait see Iowa Supreme Court, IOWA JUD. BRANCH, 
http://www.iowacourts.gov/supreme_court/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). 
31. Iowa Conservatives Renew Bid to Defeat Judge who Backs Gay Marriage, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2012, http://www.suntimes.com/news/nation/14431774-418/iowa-conservatives-
renew-bid-to-defeat-judge-who-backs-gay-marriage.html. 
32. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: 
Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 809–13 (2006) (denouncing life ten-
ure as “fundamentally flawed” and “essentially a relic of pre-democratic times,” which leaves in-
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This is not to say that riding in a “glass coach” does not provoke a piercing 
fear, especially “over Connecticut.”33 
 
This is not to say that “[o]nly in the theater of the absurd does an aristo-
cratic, life-tenured, unelected council of elders . . .” rule.34 
VII. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF LOCHNER 
The fear of fundamental rights is expressed as a fear of Lochner. 
 
In 1905, the Court in Lochner v. New York held unconstitutional a state stat-
ute limiting the working hours of bakers to sixty hours per week on the theory 
that men had a “right to purchase or to sell labor” as “part of the liberty pro-
tected” by the due process clause.35 
 
The ghost of Lochner is said to haunt contemporary judicial recognition of 
fundamental rights.36 
 
But “spirit” is a “false notion.”37 
 
But the “eye of the blackbird” should animate our perception.38 
 
The Court should declare marriage as a fundamental right. 
VIII. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF HUNGER 




frequent vacancies that are subject to an over-politicized appointment process). But cf. David R. 
Stras & Ryan W. Scott, An Empirical Analysis of Life Tenure: A Response to Professors Calabresi 
& Lindgren, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 791 (2007) (arguing for life-tenure as a practical ap-
proach in contemporary federal court system, and rebutting empirical claim made by Calabresi and 
Lindgren that changes in average tenure since 1970 are “dramatic” and “unprecedented”). 
33. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 11. 
34. READING LAW, supra note 3, at 408. 
35. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
36. See, e.g., Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost 
of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 294 (1986). 
37. See generally READING LAW, supra note 3, at 343–46 (rejecting “[t]he false notion that 
the spirit of a statute should prevail over its letter”). 
38. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 1. 
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First the Court recognized in Skinner the right not to be sterilized39—the 
right to carry (a child). From this followed Griswold and Eisenstadt; the right to 
access contraception—the right not to carry.40 As the Court stated in Eisenstadt, 
the right is “the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”41 
 
Some might disagree with this reasoning. Justice Scalia, for example, argues 
that the argument “that the only way to protect childbirth is to protect abortion” 
instead shows “the utter bankruptcy of constitutional analysis deprived of tradi-
tion as a validating factor,” adding that it “drives one to say that the only way to 
protect the right to eat is to acknowledge the constitutional right to starve oneself 
to death.”42 
 
The Court, of course, has not declared a fundamental right to eat. 
 
“O thin men of Haddam, 
Why do you imagine golden birds?”43 
 
Imagine if the energy for marriage equality had gone into economic equal-
ity. 
 
Imagine if the Court ruled there was a positive constitutional right not to be 
hungry. 
IX. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF PIECE OF THE PIE 
A fundamental right to marry, meaning a fundamental right to decide 
whether or not to marry, should prompt a reconsideration of the plethora of laws 
that now privilege marriage over nonmarriage. 
 
Correctly construed, this right would eviscerate many of the marital benefits 
that same-sex couples first sought, by more evenly distributing those benefits re-
gardless of coupled status. For example, to the extent that there are presumptive 
tax benefits—or burdens—for married couples on the basis of marriage without 
any other showing, those benefits and burdens should be unconstitutional. 
 
 
39. Skinner v. Oklahoma, ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
40. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
41. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.  
42. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980–81 n.1 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (1992). 
43. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 7. 
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Those four thousand federal and state benefits—gone. 
 
Reconsider: “The false notion that tax exemptions—or any other exemp-
tions for that matter—should be strictly construed.”44 
 
Reconsider: “The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds./ 
It was a small part of the pantomime.”45 
X. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF FEDERALISM 
In 1996, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, DOMA, section 3 of 
which provides: 
 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ 
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person 
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.46 
 
No matter what any State law provides. 
 
Several decisions finding section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional are presently 
pending before the United States Supreme Court.47 Should Justices Sotomayor 
and Kagan decide to hear one or more of these cases—the other Justices recused 
based on their marital status, which required Congressional “defense”—a deci-
sion to hold DOMA unconstitutional would favor state power over federal 
power. 
 
A decision to hold Proposition 8 unconstitutional would favor federal power 
over state power. 
 
“The half-truth that consequences of a decision provide the key to sound in-
 
44. READING LAW, supra note 3, at 359, 359–63. 
45. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 3. 
46. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419, codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).  
47. Golinski v. Office of Personnel Management, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Cal. 2012), peti-
tion for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3048 (U.S. July 3, 2012) (No. 12–16); Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts v. United States Dep’t of Health and Human Services, 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (1st Cir. 
2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3006 (U.S. July 3, 2012) (No. 12–15); Windsor v. 
United States, petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3116 (U.S. July 16, 2012) (No. 12–63). 
 




“I do not know which to prefer, 
The beauty of inflections 
Or the beauty of innuendoes, 
The blackbird whistling 
Or just after.”49 
XI. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF MONOGAMY 
Stevens on monogamy: “A man and a woman / Are one.”50 
 
Justice Scalia on nonmonogamy: “ . . . it is our moral heritage that one 
should not hate any human being or class of human beings. But I had thought 
that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for example, or 
polygamy, or cruelty to animals.”51 As well as “homosexuality.” 
 
The Court on nonmonogamy in 1878: “polygamy leads to the patriarchal 
principle, and which when applied to large communities, fetters people in sta-
tionary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with mo-
nogamy.”52 
 
Stevens on nonmonogamy: 
 
A man and a woman 
Are one. 
A man and a woman and a blackbird 
Are one.53 
XII. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF SENTIMENTALITY 
Dear Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, 
 
 
48. READING LAW, supra note 3, at 352, 352–354. 
49. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 5. 
50. Id. ¶ 4. 
51. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 644 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
52. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). 
53. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 4. 
 
2013] THIRTEEN FALSE BLACKBIRDS 325 
 
Please do not replicate this paean to marriage from the Ninth Circuit opin-
ion: 
 
Newspapers run announcements of births, deaths, and marriages. 
We are excited to see someone ask, “Will you marry me?”, 
whether on bended knee in a restaurant or in text splashed across 
a stadium Jumbotron. Certainly it would not have the same effect 
to see “Will you enter into a registered domestic partnership with 
me?”. Groucho Marx’s one-liner, “Marriage is a wonderful insti-
tution ... but who wants to live in an institution?” would lack its 
punch if the word ‘marriage’ were replaced with the alternative 
phrase. So too with Shakespeare’s “A young man married is a 
man that’s marr’d,” Lincoln’s “Marriage is neither heaven nor 
hell, it is simply purgatory,” and Sinatra’s “A man doesn’t know 
what happiness is until he’s married. By then it’s too late.” We 
see tropes like “marrying for love” versus “marrying for money” 
played out again and again in our films and literature because of 
the recognized importance and permanence of the marriage rela-
tionship. Had Marilyn Monroe’s film been called How to Regis-
ter a Domestic Partnership with a Millionaire, it would not have 
conveyed the same meaning as did her famous movie, even 
though the underlying drama for same-sex couples is no differ-
ent. The name ‘marriage’ signifies the unique recognition that 
society gives to harmonious, loyal, enduring, and intimate rela-
tionships.54 
 
“The shadow of the blackbird/ Crossed it, to and fro.”55 
 
“The false notion that committee reports and floor speeches are worthwhile 
. . . .”56 
XIII. 
THE FALSE BLACKBIRD OF DEMOCRACY 
Justice Scalia tells us a “Living Constitution” is a “Dead Democracy.”57 
 
Justice Scalia is very fond of democracy. (Let’s assume we need no remind-
 
54. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 81 U.S.L.W. 3075 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144). 
55. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 6. 
56. READING LAW, supra note 3, at 369. 
57. Id. at 410. 
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ers of the passages from his dissents in Lawrence and Romer).58 
 
Except when he is not so fond of democracy. (Let’s assume we need no re-
minders of opinions he has written or joined declaring democratically enacted 
statutes unconstitutional.) 
 
If reminders be necessary: violent video games,59 waste disposal,60 racial 
equality,61 gun control (times four),62 prohibition of violence against women,63 
labor protections for employees (times three),64 and health care (twice).65 
 
And then there is campaign finance: striking down seven democratically en-
acted attempts to limit the influence of money in democracy.66 
 
58. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586–605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636–53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
59. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (declaring unconstitu-
tional California law prohibiting sale of violent video games to minors; opinion by Scalia). 
60. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (declaring “Take Title” provision of 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act exceeded Congress’s power under Com-
merce Clause by attempting to “commandeer” state governments through compulsion); C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (declaring a municipal “flow control 
ordinance” for removal of solid waste unconstitutional because it violated the Dormant Commerce 
Clause); 
61. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996) (holding that a North Carolina “gerrymandering” 
redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment as it was not nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (declar-
ing unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment an “affirma-
tive gerrymandering” scheme in Georgia designed to give racial minorities majority votes in new 
electoral district); R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional un-
der the First Amendment a municipal ordinance criminalizing bias-motivated speech and action); 
City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding unconstitutional under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a program which gave preference to minor-
ity business enterprises in awarding municipal contracts). 
62. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (declaring unconstitutional fed-
eral statute restricting handguns in D.C.); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
63. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional federal 
law provision providing civil remedy for gender-based violence). 
64. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (declaring uncon-
stitutional provisions of the American Disabilities Act as applied to state employees); Kimel v. 
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (declaring unconstitutional provisions of Age Dis-
crimination Act as applied to state employees); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (declaring 
unconstitutional provisions of FLSA as applied to state employees). 
65. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding congres-
sional taxing power through the enactment of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
including the requirement that most Americans must have health insurance by 2014); Sorrell v. 
IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (holding that a Vermont law restricting sale, disclosure 
and use of records of individual doctors’ prescribing practice violated First Amendment).  
66. See Arizona Free Enter. Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); FEC v. Wisconsin Right 
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“Proposition 8 amended California’s Constitution to define marriage as be-
tween a man and a woman and is the state’s costliest social initiative to date, 
with more than $83 million raised.”67 
 
We will not dwell on Bush v. Gore,68 but let Justice Scalia explain: 
 
One final personal note: Your judicial author knows that there 
are some, and fears that there may be many, opinions that he has 
joined or written over the past 30 years that contradict what is 
written here—whether because of the demands of stare decisis or 
because wisdom has come late. Worse still, your judicial author 
does not swear that the opinions that he joins or writes in the fu-
ture will comply with what is written here—whether because of 
stare decisis, because wisdom continues to come late, or because 
a judge must remain open to persuasion by counsel. Yet the 
prospect of “gotchas” for past and future inconsistencies holds 
no fear.69 
 
We will let Wallace Stevens explain: 
 
I was of three minds, 
Like a tree 
In which there are three blackbirds.70 
 
We know what Scalia will decide when the Court decides Hollingsworth v. 
Perry. 
 




to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006); McConnell v. FEC, 
540 U.S. 93 (2003); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
67. Who Gave in the Gay Marriage Battle, L.A. TIMES available at 
http://projects.latimes.com/prop8/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
68. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).  
69. READING LAW, supra note 3, at xxx.  
70. Stevens, supra note 2, ¶ 3. 
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THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT A BLACKBIRD 
WALLACE STEVENS 
I 
Among twenty snowy mountains,  
The only moving thing  
Was the eye of the blackbird. 
II  
I was of three minds,  
Like a tree  
In which there are three blackbirds. 
III  
The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds. 
It was a small part of the pantomime. 
IV  
A man and a woman  
Are one.  
A man and a woman and a blackbird  
Are one. 
V  
I do not know which to prefer,  
The beauty of inflections  
Or the beauty of innuendoes,  
The blackbird whistling  
Or just after. 
VI  
Icicles filled the long window  
With barbaric glass.  
The shadow of the blackbird  
Crossed it, to and fro.  
The mood  
Traced in the shadow  
An indecipherable cause. 
VII  
O thin men of Haddam,  
Why do you imagine golden birds?  
Do you not see how the blackbird  
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Walks around the feet  
Of the women about you? 
VIII  
I know noble accents  
And lucid, inescapable rhythms;  
But I know, too,  
That the blackbird is involved  
In what I know. 
IX  
When the blackbird flew out of sight,  
It marked the edge  
Of one of many circles. 
X  
At the sight of blackbirds  
Flying in a green light,  
Even the bawds of euphony  
Would cry out sharply. 
XI  
He rode over Connecticut  
In a glass coach.  
Once, a fear pierced him,  
In that he mistook  
The shadow of his equipage  
For blackbirds. 
XII  
The river is moving.  
The blackbird must be flying. 
XIII  
It was evening all afternoon.  
It was snowing  
And it was going to snow.  
The blackbird sat  
In the cedar-limbs. 
 
